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Abstract
Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in narrative both in certain areas 
of philosophy and in the study of religion. The philosophy of religion has not itself 
been at the forefront of this narrative turn, but exceptions exist—most notably Ele-
onore Stump’s work on biblical stories and the problem of suffering. Characterizing 
Stump’s approach as an apologetic orientation, this article contrasts it with pluralis-
tic orientations that, rather than seeking to defend religious faith, are concerned with 
doing conceptual justice to the range of possible human perspectives, both religious 
and nonreligious. By discussing various examples, the article makes a case for nar-
rative philosophy of religion, especially in its pluralistic form.
Keywords Apologetics · Fyodor Dostoevsky · Hindu mythology · Narrative · 
Pluralism · Problem of evil · Suffering · Elie Wiesel
From the 1980s and 1990s onwards, certain areas of philosophical inquiry have been 
strongly invigorated by a turn to narrative art—including novels, plays and films—
and to the concept of narrativity more generally. Discussion of narrative art, espe-
cially great works of literature, has had a particular impact upon moral philosophy, 
with figures such as Stanley Cavell, Richard Eldridge and Martha Nussbaum being 
among the pioneers in this field.1 More recently, other philosophers have engaged 
with literature and with film in innovative ways, reflecting upon how narrative fic-
tion can poignantly represent certain difficulties that confront us in our lives—dif-
ficulties to which standard forms of philosophy often fail to do justice because of a 
greater concern with building arguments that have generalizable conclusions than 
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with bringing out the messy complexities of everyday experiences.2 Also notable 
has been the turn to narrativity in the philosophy of personhood by those who argue 
“that the self needs to be understood in terms of narrative” (Rudd 2012, 1).3
In the broad field of the study of religion, narrative has featured most prominently 
in Christian theology, with some theologians contending that religious faith has a 
deeply narrative structure—that “[s]tories do not merely decorate or illustrate, but 
provide the substance of faith” (Tilley 1985, xvii), for it is through the telling of 
stories that the distinctively human story can “be bound in with that of God and 
Jesus” (Mauz 2009, 262).4 The philosophy of religion, by contrast, has been some-
what slow to pick up on the significance of narrative. Rare exceptions include Stew-
art Sutherland’s insightful examination of the themes of atheism and faith in relation 
to Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (Sutherland 1977) and two collections of 
essays by D. Z. Phillips (1982, 2006). A more influential intervention has been Ele-
onore Stump’s major study of biblical narratives as a vehicle for thinking through 
the problem of suffering (Stump 2010)—a study that has in turn elicited numerous 
responses, both critical and complimentary.5 What all these works demonstrate is 
the promising potential of a turn to narrative in the philosophy of religion.
The purpose of the present article is twofold. One of its aims is to establish not 
that the turn to narrative is necessarily superior to other ways of engaging in the 
philosophy of religion, but that it constitutes a coherent and productive approach, 
or cluster of approaches, capable of yielding richer and more nuanced understand-
ings of religious possibilities than is often supplied by other methods. In connection 
with this aim, I shall, for the most part, be using the phrase “narrative philosophy of 
religion” to identify the type of approach in which I am interested. What I mean by 
this phrase is not—or, at any rate, not primarily—a type of philosophy that takes a 
narrative form itself rather than the kind of more recognizably argumentative form 
that is typical of philosophical essays and monographs. There have, of course, been 
important philosophers who have authored literary works that are rightly celebrated 
for their philosophical content: figures such as Voltaire, de Beauvoir, Camus and 
Sartre immediately come to mind. And elsewhere I have argued that certain literary 
works that were not composed by philosophers can nevertheless be regarded as par-
ticipating in philosophy of religion, broadly construed (Burley 2017). In this article, 
however, what I mean to designate by the phrase “narrative philosophy of religion” 
is the type of philosophical inquiry into religion that, without becoming a work of 
narrative art itself, takes seriously the contribution of narrative sources to our philo-
sophical understanding of religion and, in the course of developing a philosophical 
4 For an accessible survey of narrative theological approaches up to 1987, see Comstock (1987). For 
more recent perspectives, see Ganzevoort et al. (2014). For a critical view, see Murphy (2007).
5 Notable responses include Draper (2011), Fales (2013), Efird and Worsley (2015). See also Stump 
(2012).
3 See especially work by MacIntyre (2007), Taylor (1989) and Ricoeur (1984–1988). For critical per-
spectives, see Strawson (2004) and Lamarque (2007).
2 Work by Diamond (2003; reprinted in Cavell et al. 2008) and  Mulhall (2009) is especially relevant. On 
film as a philosophical and ethical medium, see Mulhall (2016) and Sinnerbrink (2016).
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argument, engages with such sources in a sustained manner rather than, at most, cit-
ing them only cursorily as mere decoration.
Beyond making a case for narrative philosophy of religion in general, the second 
aim of this article is to distinguish between two orientations in narrative philosophy 
of religion. For the most part, I shall refer to these two orientations as apologetic 
and pluralistic respectively, though in certain instances other terms might serve just 
as well. What I am calling an apologetic orientation to narrative philosophy of reli-
gion is one that sees its principal task as being to defend religion—and most com-
monly this will be Christianity in particular—from critical philosophical attacks. 
A primary example is Stump’s aforementioned work on the problem of suffering, 
for Stump is not interested merely in exploring how this problem is treated in vari-
ous narrative sources; rather, she wishes to draw upon biblical narratives to inform 
her argument “that suffering can be redeemed for the sufferer in personal relation-
ship, that heartbreak can be woven into joy through the reciprocity of love” (2010, 
xix). What I am calling a pluralistic orientation, meanwhile, is one that seeks not 
to defend either Christianity or any other religious system, but rather to promote a 
deeper understanding of a plurality of perspectives, both religious and nonreligious. 
Sutherland and Phillips are among the exemplars of this approach. Although each of 
them is more knowledgeable about, and more personally interested in, Christianity 
than in any other religion, they both strive to bring out the intelligibility of multiple 
points of view without overtly endorsing any of them as the true, or most rational, 
position to adopt.
While not simply dismissing the apologetic orientation, I emphasize the merits of 
a pluralistic orientation to narrative, especially as a means of diversifying the range 
of religious traditions and forms of religiosity that are amenable to being discussed 
in the philosophy of religion. To this end, in addition to the examples of Suther-
land and Phillips, I also include a section on work by the Indologist Wendy Doniger 
O’Flaherty on Hindu mythology as a philosophical resource. A growing chorus of 
voices has been calling in recent years for an expansion of philosophy of religion, 
both methodologically and in terms of subject matter, and it is my contention that a 
turn towards narrativity is one among other important means of rising to that chal-
lenge. What I am calling apologetic and pluralistic orientations, respectively, will 
each be discussed below. A theme running through the discussion will be concep-
tions of, or responses to, evil and suffering, for not only is this among the paramount 
themes in the relevant literature, but it also facilitates a higher degree of compara-
tive analysis across my various examples than would otherwise be the case. First, 
however, let us consider the more general question of why narrativity might be of 
philosophical interest at all.
Why narrativity?
Much of what needs to be said in this article about why a narrative approach to phi-
losophy of religion might be a fruitful one to pursue will come out in the discussions 
of the apologetic and pluralistic orientations that follow. Before coming to those dis-
cussions, however, it is worth pausing to register some important observations about 
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narrativity that can be gleaned from other philosophical areas, especially moral phi-
losophy. These observations may help to strengthen the case for taking seriously 
narrative philosophizing in general, thereby also motivating the case for looking 
more rigorously at narrative philosophy of religion in particular.
Among the salient motivations for regarding literature, or narrative art more 
broadly, as being in some sense internal rather than external to philosophy is a two-
fold conviction in the importance of style. First, there is the conviction that the style 
or form of a piece of writing “is not separable from philosophical content, but is, 
itself, a part of content” (Nussbaum 1990, 3). Second, is the related conviction that, 
in the case of certain perspectives on human life or the world, these perspectives 
can be adequately articulated only by means of narrative (ibid., 7). When combined 
together, these two convictions generate the view that narrative artworks can make 
valuable contributions to our understanding of what it is to be human, and of what 
it means to live a good human life, that are not translatable into the dry emotionless 
prose of standard academic philosophy. Whether the contributions of the narrative 
artworks in question may then be treated as properly philosophical will, inevitably, 
depend to a great extent on how capaciously the notion of philosophy is concep-
tualized. In the case of moral philosophy, or ethics, Nussbaum opts for “the very 
simple Aristotelian idea that ethics is the search for a specification of the good life 
for a human being” (1990, 139). She chooses this formulation not arbitrarily but 
because she considers it “broadly correct” and “sufficiently inclusive to command 
wide agreement” (1990, 139)—but also because of its potential to encompass what 
certain works of literary fiction are in the business of doing.
In an essay that is largely sympathetic to Nussbaum’s project, Cora Diamond 
(1983) takes as her starting point Nussbaum’s recognition of the need for an 
expansive conception of moral philosophy if narrative art’s relevance to it is to be 
acknowledged. For additional conceptual resources, Diamond looks to ideas from 
Iris Murdoch about the place that morality has in human life. In a contribution 
to a symposium on “Vision and Choice in Morality,” Murdoch observes that our 
assessments of other people are not limited to their actions or choices, but extend to 
“something more elusive which may be called their total vision of life” or, in another 
metaphor, “the texture of a man’s being” (Murdoch 1956, 39). While noting that it is 
the metaphor of vision that tends to be uppermost in Murdoch’s own philosophical 
work, Diamond finds the term “texture of being” more evocative of what is at issue 
in moral philosophy’s relation to literature (Diamond 1983, 162). This is the case 
because when we pay close attention to what many novelists offer, we see not only 
that it is precisely what might be termed an account of the “texture of being” of par-
ticular human lives, but also that it is offered “out of an interest we may properly call 
moral” (ibid.). Extending Murdoch’s point, Diamond adds that it need not be only 
the lives of individual people to which moral reflection is directed, but also “forms 
of social life” (163). In passing, we might mention that these could include forms of 
life that are distinctly religious.
It is beyond the scope of my own discussion to enter into the debate over which 
conception of moral philosophy ought to be preferred. The crucial point for our pre-
sent purposes is that the question of what, if anything, literature or other narrative art 
has to contribute to moral philosophy is inseparable from the question of what moral 
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philosophy is (or ought to be). Those who operate with a narrow conception—one 
which views moral philosophy’s task primarily in terms of questions about the per-
missibility, impermissibility or obligatoriness of certain types of action—are apt to 
see narratives as relevant only insofar as they can furnish “evidence” in support of 
or against general action-guiding principles (see Raphael 1983, 1). Those who are 
favourable to broader conceptions, meanwhile, will tend to be more sympathetic 
to the view that, beyond merely supplying examples or counterexamples, narrative 
art can itself be—to invoke a phrase from Cavell—“in the condition of philosophy” 
(Cavell 1979, 14; see also Mulhall 2016, 85, 88).
Thus, what philosophy has to gain from a turn to narrative inevitably remains 
contested. But the fact that the turn itself facilitates a deepening of the argument 
over what philosophy is, or what its possibilities are, speaks in favour of taking the 
turn seriously. What those who recommend an expansive conception of philosophy 
often appreciate most about narrative sources is their ability to draw to our attention 
the details of particular characters and situations—details that are routinely glossed 
over in the broad-brushed theoretical claims of mainstream philosophy. By refusing 
to simplify the complexities of the everyday, and by striving to bring those com-
plexities to life in vivid description, narrative art can heighten our awareness of cer-
tain features of human existence—its “texture of being”—that are otherwise readily 
missed or ignored. This, at any rate, is among the signal benefits that many philoso-
phers see in narrative materials: the affordance of richly contextualized scenarios 
that invite cognitive, imaginative and emotional involvement from the audience, as 
opposed to thinly formulated arguments that are forced to traffic in simplifications 
by virtue of the high level of generality that they attempt to achieve. With these 
points in view, we are now in a position to examine different ways in which narrative 
sources have been engaged with in the philosophy of religion.
An apologetic orientation to narrative philosophy of religion
Narrative philosophy of religion with an apologetic orientation has much in com-
mon with narrative theology. Both enterprises appeal to religious stories, principally 
in the form of biblical scripture, to support the viability of faith in the face of “the 
challenges of Enlightenment thinkers to the cognitive plausibility of Christian doc-
trine” (Oakes 1992, 38), and central among these is the challenge to the belief in a 
God of love that results from the pervasiveness of evil and suffering in the world. 
Eleonore Stump situates her major work, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the 
Problem of Suffering (2010), within the field of philosophy of religion, though it is 
no less an attempt at Christian apologetics than are the numerous products of narra-
tive theologians.
Early on in her project, Stump ventures an incisive critique of much of what 
passes for philosophy of religion in the analytic tradition. While recognizing its 
virtues of argumentative rigour and logical precision, Stump cautiously concurs 
with those who complain of the “aridity” and “narrowness” typified by this style 
of philosophizing (2010, 23). A particular weakness that Stump highlights, citing 
Bernard Williams as a critical ally in this regard, is the apparent inability of many 
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analytic philosophers to do justice in their discussions to the intricacies of inter-
personal encounters and relationships. Instead of invoking “complex cases drawn 
from real life or from the world’s great literature,” Stump charges, such philoso-
phers typically make do with under-described thought-experiments featuring per-
functorily sketched characters (with generic names such as “Smith,” “Jones,” etc.) 
(2010, 25). To overcome these deficiencies, Stump proposes a marriage between 
standard methods of analytic philosophy on the one hand and “the study of narra-
tive” on the other (ibid.). Articulating this marriage in terms of a union between 
two modes of knowledge, she designates these modes “Dominican” and “Francis-
can” respectively (after the Catholic religious orders of those names).
In Stump’s vocabulary, Dominican knowledge is what is commonly referred 
to in philosophical parlance as propositional knowledge or “knowledge that” (i.e. 
knowledge that such-and-such is the case); it is a type of knowledge that is acquir-
able via the methods of analytic philosophy. Franciscan knowledge, meanwhile, is 
gained by acquaintance, and among its varieties is knowledge of persons. Char-
acterizing this latter knowledge as “direct, intuitive, non-propositional,” Stump 
adds that, though normally enabled by direct acquaintance with a person, it “can 
also be transmitted to a greater or lesser extent by stories” (Stump 2012, 199). 
Stump’s central claim concerning biblical narratives is, then, that these provide 
the attentive reader with Franciscan knowledge both of the characters in the story 
and of the lifeworld they inhabit, much as visiting a foreign country facilitates 
knowledge of its people and places (2012, 198). For Stump’s purposes, the cru-
cial consequence of this is that the insight gained into the world of the narrative 
enables one to understand how the suffering of certain characters is redeemed: it 
is redeemed on account of its engendering a deepened relationship with God on 
the part of the characters in question. Moreover, it is in “the details of the narra-
tive of a life” that we learn how suffering can, at least in some circumstances, be 
received “as a gift” (2010, xviii).
Stump’s exposition and analysis of four biblical stories is too extensive and elab-
orate to be discussed in detail here. In order to explicate the contrast that I wish to 
make between apologetic and pluralistic narrative philosophizing, I shall focus on 
her treatment of one biblical narrative, the story of Job; in doing so, I borrow a line 
of criticism from Wes Morriston.
In her discussion of the Book of Job, Stump is careful to acknowledge that “inter-
pretations of texts can invite one to see the text in a certain light, but they cannot 
compel assent as philosophical arguments are meant to try to do” (2010, 178). Nev-
ertheless, the light in which Stump invites us to see the story of Job is liable to strike 
many readers as excessively one-sided in its sanguinity. Focusing especially on the 
passages in which God is portrayed as speaking directly to Job, Stump maintains 
that these speeches “suggest that God’s relationship to all his creatures is personal, 
intimate, and parental” (191). Even in the difficult case of a passage about female 
ostriches, which are described as incompetent mothers who forget that leaving 
their eggs on the ground could result in the eggs’ being trampled by wild animals, 
Stump discerns a “loving” and “tender” insinuation. There is tenderness here, Stump 
opines, because it is God who reminds the ostrich and safeguards the eggs that she 
“so forgetfully left vulnerable” (189). If we read the biblical passage as a whole, 
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however, we see that the ostrich is described as dealing “cruelly with her young, 
as if they were not hers,” and as lacking fear because God has deprived her of wis-
dom and understanding (Job 39:16–18).6 It is hard to see how Stump’s insistence on 
God’s parental tenderness could be made to fit with such descriptions.
Similarly, when God asks Job rhetorically who it is that “provides for the raven 
its prey, when its young ones cry to God, and wander about for lack of food” (Job 
38:41), Stump zeros in on the phrase “cry to God” as exemplifying how intimate the 
relationship is between God and the animals he has created (Stump 2010, 189). As 
Morriston points out, however, the feeding of young ravens—in cases when they are 
fed at all—is part of a broader context in which prey animals are killed by preda-
tors, since the ravens scavenge from the carcasses that the predators leave behind 
(Morriston 2017, 233). The natural world, as depicted in the Book of Job, is a place 
of violence and death at least as much as it is one of nurturing love and benevo-
lence, and yet Stump downplays the violence and accentuates what she perceives as 
the caring relationship in which God stands to his creatures. Morriston thus regards 
Stump as reading the text through the filter of her own assumptions concerning 
God’s providential plan and its portrayal in the Bible rather than as making a genu-
ine effort to do justice to the narrative itself (2017, 229).
Morriston’s critique of Stump’s idealized and romanticized interpretation of 
God’s speeches, and of other aspects of the story of Job, is well taken. By exag-
gerating the extent to which God is depicted as a loving parent in the story, Stump 
presents a one-sided construal that, in the absence of a counterbalancing reading 
such as Morriston’s, risks obscuring the variety of interpretations to which the text 
is amenable. While there is nothing inherently wrong with propounding a partisan 
interpretation of a narrative source, it is essential that readers of the interpretation 
remain alert to the interpreter’s agenda, which in Stump’s case is decidedly apolo-
getic and theodicean.
Before moving on to consider a pluralistic narrative orientation, it will be instruc-
tive to note a deep tension in the book of Stump’s that we have been examining. 
The tension concerns Stump’s attitude towards discussing the Holocaust or Shoah 
in the philosophy of religion. As important background for pinpointing the ten-
sion, two elements of Stump’s book may be mentioned. First is the fact that she 
chooses as the book’s incipit an anonymous poem, found on a wall at the notorious 
Auschwitz concentration camp, that declares grace and wonder to be “hard to see, 
/ hard to embrace, for / those compelled to / wander in darkness” (quoted in Stump 
2010, xx).7 It is from the poem’s final line that her book’s title, Wandering in Dark-
ness, is derived. Second is Stump’s assertion that the Holocaust is among the evils 
that “are not fit subjects for the academic exploration of the problem of evil,” for to 
treat it “as one more example or counter-example in academic disputation” would 
be “unspeakably awful” (2010, 16). The tension that interests me is not, strictly, 
between Stump’s use of the poem from Auschwitz and her refusal to discuss the 
Holocaust directly, since it is one thing to pay homage to victims of the Holocaust in 
6 Revised Standard Version (Holy Bible 1952, 471).
7 Stump derives this English rendering of the poem from Czarnecki (1989, 11).
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an epigraph and another to dwell upon the terrible details of their suffering as part 
of one’s argument. The tension, rather, is between, on the one hand, Stump’s appar-
ent recognition that there is something baffling about the horror of the Holocaust—a 
horror that renders attempts to incorporate it into philosophical discourse inadequate 
at best and downright offensive at worst—and, on the other hand, the claim of her 
book as a whole to have supplied a response, by means of interpretations of biblical 
narratives, to every form of suffering there is.
While acknowledging that instances of suffering more horrendous than those 
recounted in the biblical stories she has discussed occurred during both the Holo-
caust and the era of American slavery, Stump maintains that, considered together, 
the four stories with which she deals—namely, those of Job, Samson, Abraham, 
and Mary of Bethany—afford a comprehensive typology among which “[a]ll modes 
of suffering” may be found, “even if many of its species are missing” (2010, 375). 
Given that she regards her overall argument as amounting to a “defense”—in the 
technical philosophical sense of an account that shows, not the truth of, but the 
coherence of the claim that God has reasons for allowing suffering that are “mor-
ally sufficient” to “defeat” the negative value of the suffering itself (see Stump 2010, 
13)—the contention Stump is making on behalf of her project becomes puzzling. 
The contention seems to be that, without having discussed the Holocaust or Ameri-
can slavery directly, a defence has nevertheless been provided of how the “modes” 
of suffering endured by victims of those, and other, dreadful historical events could 
be consistent with the propitious designs of a God of love. If this is not a fair sum-
mary of the claim Stump is making, then it becomes unclear how the argument of 
her book amounts to a defence at all, for if paradigms of extreme suffering such as 
those experienced by victims of slavery or the Holocaust are to be left aside (on the 
grounds that discussing them in this context would be “unspeakably awful”), then 
in what sense has a defence that “defeats the badness of suffering” (2010, 13) been 
supplied?
The difficulty of understanding the intended scope of Stump’s argument derives 
from a clash between her totalizing apologetic ambition and her recognition that 
certain “species” of suffering are simply not appropriate subjects of philosophical 
“explanation” or “defense.” What I have also contended in this section is that an 
apologetic orientation to narrative philosophy of religion encourages a one-sided 
interpretive approach. This in itself need not be problematic, provided it is balanced 
by readers’ having access to alternative interpretations of the relevant narrative 
sources. What a pluralistic orientation actively fosters, however, is precisely such 
a two-sided, or multisided, approach, thereby encouraging a richer appreciation of 
interpretive possibilities. Insofar, then, as one values an appreciation of this sort, one 
has a reason for approving of a pluralistic orientation, which I shall now elaborate in 
relation first to Sutherland, second to Phillips, and third to O’Flaherty.
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Pluralistic narrative philosophy of religion 1: Stewart Sutherland 
on Dostoevsky
The publication of Sutherland’s that is most pertinent in this context is his Athe-
ism and the Rejection of God: Contemporary Philosophy and “The Brothers Kara-
mazov” (1977), in which he analyses how Dostoevsky’s final novel vividly depicts, 
first, a compelling form of atheism in the character of Ivan Karamazov, and sec-
ond, the deeply religious form of life both of Ivan’s younger brother Alyosha and of 
Alyosha’s mentor, the elder monk Father Zossima. Like Stump, Sutherland is keen 
to show that a story can advance a perceptive account of the place that suffering has 
in human lives and of how individuals respond to the existence of suffering in the 
world—an account that cannot readily be paraphrased in the more austere prose of 
standard philosophical exposition. Unlike Stump, however, Sutherland is not trying 
to advocate for one particular attitude to suffering, an attitude that views the nega-
tive value of suffering as being outweighed by the closeness of the relationship with 
God that it can expedite. Rather, Sutherland’s purpose is to demonstrate that diver-
gent responses to the existence of suffering can each be viable, and that Dostoevsky 
himself ensures that his novel does justice to the competing responses, laying them 
before the reader without didactically commending one and denigrating the other. If 
readers are to learn anything from the novel, it is that a plurality of responses to the 
world, a plurality of ways of being human, can make sense and exhibit a high degree 
of moral seriousness without its being the case that we can decide between them on 
the basis of a knockdown philosophical argument.
Through the character of Ivan Karamazov, Dostoevsky voices the strongest con-
ceivable moral objection to the claim that the world is overseen and cared for by 
a God of love. That objection consists in the incontrovertible observation that we 
inhabit a world in which the most terrible atrocities occur, including the torture and 
agonizing deaths of children. By describing such incidents, Ivan—and hence Dos-
toevsky—refuses to allow the defender of religion to hide from the grisly reality by 
taking refuge in the conjectures of theoretical discourse. In this respect, the tools 
of narrative are deployed to the end of starkly confronting Christian faith with its 
greatest challenge, and in the person of Ivan we are shown someone who, out of a 
professed “love for humanity,” feels compelled to reject any “entrance ticket” into a 
world where obscenities such as the torture of children are forgiven (Dostoyevsky 
1900 [1880], 291). (In passing, we might note that Stump, in contrast to Dostoevs-
ky’s Ivan, restricts her deliberations to the suffering “of adult human beings who are 
mentally fully functional” (2010, 4), thereby again casting doubt upon her claim to 
have covered all the “modes” of suffering there are.)
Having articulated the case against faith in a God of love and mercy, Dostoevsky 
proceeds, in Book 6 of the novel, to develop an “answer to all those atheistical prop-
ositions” in the form not of a “point by point” riposte, but of “an artistic picture” 
(Dostoevsky, in Coulson 1962, 224). As Sutherland puts it, Dostoevsky imagines 
(and thus enables his readers to imagine) a form of life in which the distinctively 
Christian vocabulary—comprising concepts such as those of God, worship, eter-
nal life, miracles, prayer and so on—can be seen to retain a profound meaning and 
 International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
1 3
vivacity for Christian believers, notwithstanding the extent to which it has been 
harangued by Ivan in terms that many readers are apt to find morally persuasive 
(see Sutherland 1977, 86–87). This resurrection, as it were, of Christian discourse 
is performed through Dostoevsky’s portrayal of the sincere religious lives of Father 
Zossima and his disciple Alyosha.
As Sutherland sees it, and as I have concurred elsewhere (Burley 2017, 116), the 
issue of whether Dostoevsky’s novel is successful in presenting a possibility of reli-
gious sense—a possible way of living out a Christian life—does not require that 
it convince anyone of the truth of Christian doctrine. Sutherland follows Mikhail 
Bakhtin in regarding The Brothers Karamazov as a “polyphonic” novel, in which a 
“plurality of independent … voices” are brought together without being fused into 
one (Bakhtin 1984, 6). The plurality remains undiluted, for “No single vision could 
encompass all that Dostoevsky refused to omit” (Sutherland 1977, 140).
Clearly, much more could be said both about the work of Dostoevsky himself 
and about the ways in which Sutherland explicates that work in order to make a case 
for its philosophical value. For my purposes here, however, enough has been said to 
indicate how the novel, and what Sutherland makes of it, may be treated as instances 
of pluralistic narrative philosophy of religion. The orientation is pluralistic inas-
much as it seeks to elucidate more than one perspective, or more than one “texture 
of being” (to borrow the phrase that Diamond adapts from Murdoch), as opposed 
to building a one-sided defence of a religious ideology. To illustrate the orientation 
further, I turn now to work by D. Z. Phillips.
Pluralistic narrative philosophy of religion 2: D. Z. Phillips on Elie 
Wiesel
A characteristic of Phillips’s philosophical work in general is its emphasis on “pos-
sibilities of sense” or “possibilities of meaning”—the clarification of possible forms 
of human life rather than the attempt to establish the superiority of any one of them. 
This emphasis carries over into his work in the philosophy of religion, where he 
strives to “discuss possibilities of religious sense, often ignored by contemporary 
advocates and critics of religion” (2006, xi). When selecting narrative sources as 
his focus, Phillips prioritizes those that, by grappling with the gritty realities of peo-
ple’s impulses, emotions and commitments, tend to avoid “the distortions of human 
suffering so often found in religious apologetics” (ibid.). Especially poignant in 
this connection is Phillips’s treatment of Elie Wiesel’s harrowing autobiographi-
cal accounts of his experiences as a teenage Jewish prisoner in the Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald concentration camps towards the end of the Second World War.
We might note immediately that Phillips shared Eleonore Stump’s revulsion at 
the thought of treating the Holocaust, or any other occurrence of extreme human 
suffering, “as one more example or counter-example in academic disputation on the 
problem of evil” (Stump 2010, 16, quoted earlier). Phillips frequently rails against 
the type of instrumentalist thinking of theodicists who suppose that finding a reli-
gious “explanation” of the Holocaust is simply a matter of establishing what Richard 
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Swinburne (among others) describes as “the greater good which allowing … such 
horrible things to occur makes possible” (Swinburne 1998, 107), such as the oppor-
tunities for displaying bravery, sympathy and other virtues (ibid., 151). Both Phillips 
and Stump would agree that even entering into such cost-benefit analyses is, as Phil-
lips puts it, already to have travelled too far along a road “we shouldn’t have turned 
into in the first place” (2004, 71). But Phillips discovered more subtle ways of 
reflecting philosophically on the implications for religious faith of immense human 
tragedies, including the Holocaust, and Wiesel’s memoirs are among the sources 
that facilitated those reflections.
Like Ivan Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s novel, Wiesel refuses to romanticize the 
horrors of extreme suffering; he is not afraid to point out the extent to which tor-
ture and humiliation can crush a person’s spirit and provoke debased behaviour. He 
recounts, for instance, how, on a long forced March from one concentration camp to 
another, the son of an elderly rabbi hurried ahead of his father, hoping thereby “to 
free himself of a burden that could diminish his own chance for survival” (Wiesel 
2006, 91), and how, when packed into cattle wagons, the inmates would fight among 
themselves over scraps of bread thrown to them by passers-by, sometimes killing 
even members of their own family in the process (101). These are experiences that, 
for Wiesel and for many of his fellow prisoners, far from engendering a closer rela-
tionship with God, destroyed their faith. This is a fact that Phillips recognizes: that 
encounters with evil can, and often do, obliterate a person’s ability to believe and 
trust in God, and it is through the testimony of witnesses such as Wiesel that we 
are enabled all too vividly to understand that response. Yet Phillips also wishes to 
acknowledge that this is not always the case. For some victims of catastrophic hor-
rors, faith is retained or even strengthened. To make the point, Phillips cites a prayer 
found next to the body of a dead child at the Ravensbrück camp: “And may the love 
that we have known be their forgiveness” (quoted in Phillips 2004, 269).8 The pur-
pose of citing such a prayer is not to furnish evidence in support of an argument that 
this is how religious believers ought to respond to brutal oppression; it is to indicate 
that this response is possible. A believer in God might regard such faith as a gift 
of grace. For the pluralistic philosopher of religion, it may indeed be something to 
marvel at—as a human possibility—but it remains one possibility among others.
In the examples I have so far adumbrated, from Sutherland on Dostoevsky and 
from Phillips on Wiesel, we see ways in which narrative sources, whether novelistic 
or autobiographical, may assist philosophical reflection upon aspects of faith, and 
upon the loss or rejection thereof, in broadly Christian or Jewish contexts. It is also 
important to the case I am making in favour of a pluralistic orientation to narrative 
philosophy of religion that at least one example be given of how this orientation 
can help to widen the range of topics discussed in philosophy of religion beyond 
the usual domain of “theism” construed in Christian-centric or, at most, in loosely 
Abrahamic terms. Phillips’s own work on non-Abrahamic religions tends to draw 
more upon cultural anthropological sources than on narrative ones (see esp. Phillips 
8 In a more common translation of the prayer, this line reads “and when they come to judgement let all 
the fruits which we have borne be their forgiveness” (see, e.g., Appleton 1985, 112, prayer 367).
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2001), so in the next section I instead look to work by the Indologist Wendy Doniger 
O’Flaherty on the concept of evil in relation to Hindu mythological stories.
Pluralistic narrative philosophy of religion 3: evil and suffering 
in Hindu mythology
Philosophy of religion as it is practised in Western academic settings has struggled 
to find ways of overcoming the constraints of a relatively fixed canon of topics that 
revolve around the rationality of a “classical theistic” conception of God. The so-
called problem of evil as it is standardly formulated is one of those topics, presup-
posing, as it does, that God is to be conceived of as, among other things, omnipo-
tent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. One of the implications of a turn to narrative 
is that the focus is shifted—away from forms of argumentation that involve mar-
shalling premises in support of a conclusion that can be stated as a concise propo-
sition, and towards more nuanced accounts of the lived experience of determinate 
characters, whose responses to suffering may help to open our minds and imagina-
tions to human possibilities we had previously neglected or undervalued. More than 
this, however, the turn to narrative can also provide a route into the examination of 
modes of religiosity beyond the usual repertoire of Western philosophical preoccu-
pations. Exemplary of this potential is much of Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty’s work, 
including her book The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (1976).9
By using, as a resource for reflecting upon the concept of evil, the variegated 
body of narrative texts deriving from multiple Hindu (and also some Buddhist and 
Jain) traditions, O’Flaherty demonstrates how philosophical ideas may be found 
outside of what are normally treated as properly philosophical works. Her remark 
that “scholars have overlooked the problem of evil in Indian thought because they 
have sought it in philosophy rather than in mythology” (1976, 7) might thus also be 
regarded as a plea to revise the assumption that a sharp distinction obtains between 
the philosophical and the mythological, whether in Indian or in other cultural 
traditions.
Once the turn to mythology is made, there comes into view a wealth of mate-
rial—indeed, a veritable “embarras de richesse” (1976, 10)—relevant to the con-
cept of evil and to closely related themes. One of the most important findings of 
O’Flaherty’s research is, precisely, that evil and suffering have been thought about 
in numerous ways over the long course of Indian religious, philosophical and cul-
tural history. Unsurprisingly, one of the most salient of these ways is to invoke the 
doctrine of karma and rebirth, according to which there is, built into the structure 
of the universe, a retributive function that generates, either in this life or in some 
future reincarnation, unpleasant experiences or circumstances for those who breach 
the code of right action and pleasant experiences or advantageous circumstances for 
9 From 1989 onwards, Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty has published under the name Wendy Doniger. 
Besides the book that I discuss here, publications of philosophical interest include O’Flaherty (1980, 
1984) and Doniger (1998, 1999).
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those who fulfil their duties. What sustained attention to the mythological literature 
reveals, however, is that this doctrine of retributive karma has often been supple-
mented by or even subordinated to other conceptions of the roots of evil, such as the 
notion of malevolent demons who repeatedly try to supplant the benign gods as rul-
ers of the universe or the further notion of an ultimately supreme deity who incor-
porates evil into the divine plan for reasons known only to the deity himself or her-
self—or for no specific reason at all. To give even a brief summary of all the mythic 
themes that O’Flaherty examines is beyond the scope of my present discussion. As 
an illustrative example, however, I shall here outline an aspect of how gender-related 
and sexual ethical values can be expressed through mythic narratives concerning the 
origin of evil and sin.
In this connection, O’Flaherty reminds us how Indian myths are typically set 
within a comprehensive cosmological framework, involving cyclical cosmic ages 
that last for thousands of years each. As one age gives way to the next, there is a con-
tinuous degeneration of morality and a corresponding decline in lifespan and general 
well-being. Eventually, a cosmic collapse or conflagration or inundation occurs, fol-
lowed by a period of quiescence and then a renewal of the golden age, at which point 
the serial degeneration begins again. Articulations of sexual ethics are embedded in 
these cosmological narratives by the association of different methods of reproduc-
tion with the successive cosmic ages: originally, “people were born by imagination,” 
but then different forms of sexual intercourse became necessary (O’Flaherty 1976, 
27). In one version of this type of myth, enunciated in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (c. 
third to ninth centuries CE) and the Kūrma Purāṇa (c. eighth century CE), it is 
said that procreation originally happened without the need for women to menstru-
ate; at that time, people lived long, fulfilling and virtuous lives “without desire” and 
“without any affliction”; then, as an insidious physical and moral corruption spread, 
“lustful passion arose, and because of their passion women began to menstruate, and 
they conceived again and again”; greediness escalated, trees died because they had 
been “fenced in,” hunger increased and cities had to be built to house the excessively 
growing populace (O’Flaherty 1976, 27).
As O’Flaherty brings out in her analysis, stories such as the one just summarized 
give voice to the view, derived from ascetic strands of ancient Brahmanical ortho-
doxy, that the production of offspring is to be kept separate from sexual passion. 
Menstruation, often symbolic both of female sexuality and of spiritual impurity, 
is linked through the narrative not only to overpopulation, but also to an ensuing 
scarcity of food and a move from rural to urban habitation, replete with its stresses 
and strains (ibid., 28). Building upon O’Flaherty’s exposition and interpretation, we 
might add that mythic narratives of this sort contribute not so much to the presenta-
tion of philosophical arguments for a certain origin of sin or suffering, as to the con-
struction of an elaborate worldview, of which distinctive values and attitudes are in 
large part constitutive. In this case, the values and attitudes are concerned especially 
with women’s sexuality and with erotic impulses more broadly; in other myths, 
meanwhile, different features of human existence and its place in the world are apt 
to be foregrounded. The value of studying such myths in the context of philosophy 
of religion is not to form, or reinforce, one-sided pictures of Hindu conceptions of 
womanhood, since a diverse range of representations of women and goddesses is 
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available in Hindu mythology as a whole. Rather, it is, again, to discover a point of 
entry into religiously inflected ways of thinking and responding to the world that are 
not only of intrinsic philosophical interest, but also transcend the standard Western 
philosophical fixation on narrow conceptions of theism.
Concluding remarks
The preceding three sections have been intended not as an exhaustive exposition 
of what a pluralistic orientation to narrative philosophy of religion has to offer, 
but as a selection of poignant examples that illustrate the orientation’s potential. 
Narrative approaches constitute one among several directions that may produc-
tively be pursued by those who wish to diversify the subject matter and methods 
of philosophy of religion. What I have sought to expose in my discussion is that 
an apologetic orientation is liable to result in one-sided treatments of the nar-
rative sources. Provided readers have access to alternative interpretations of the 
sources at issue, this need not be disastrous. But there remains the likelihood that 
the apologetic proponents’ own readings will be driven by preformed ideological 
agendas rather than by a sustained willingness to do justice to subtleties and pos-
sible ambivalences within the texts.
A pluralistic orientation is, by its nature, internally variegated. That is why I 
have used the term “orientation”—to indicate that it is something broader than a 
strict method directed towards a single goal. Its pluralizing tendency facilitates a 
deepened appreciation, on the part of the reader, of plurality among the religious 
beliefs, practices or forms of life themselves, though there is no neatly summariz-
able formula for how that deepened appreciation is achieved. When prosecuted 
effectively, however, a pluralistic narrative orientation will amount to far more 
than a mere retelling or repetition of the stories that are examined. Rather, the 
stories are invoked and explicated by the philosopher for particular purposes, the 
principal purpose being to disrupt or call into question any presuppositions held 
by the reader, or by other philosophers, that prematurely close down the range 
of possible religious (or nonreligious) responses to the world. That is the critical 
dimension of a pluralistic narrative approach.
Owing to the pluralistic nature of a pluralistic orientation, I opted in this 
article to outline some indicative examples instead of constructing an abstract 
account. Despite the multifariousness of the examples, the fact that each of them 
is concerned in some way with issues of evil or suffering affords a higher degree 
of coherence to my comparative analysis than it would otherwise have had. In 
Sutherland’s engagement with Dostoevsky, we see how a great work of imagina-
tive literature can be discussed in ways that accentuate the work’s philosophical 
richness—a richness that consists not in portraying a single ideological position, 
but in giving vivid expression to divergent perspectives on life and the world. 
By that means, both the novel itself and the philosophical discussion of it are 
able to participate in a pluralistic analysis of the various textures of human life, 
elucidating possibilities of sense rather than presuming to know the one correct 
perspective for everyone to adopt. Meanwhile, the example of Phillips’s appeal to 
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the chilling memoirs of Elie Wiesel illustrates a means by which the horrors of 
the Holocaust can be brought within the sphere of philosophical reflection upon 
horrendous evil and suffering, without the need to turn those horrors into mere 
evidence for an overgeneralizing thesis. As Eleonore Stump, and Phillips him-
self, recognize, to treat immense human tragedies in that way would be a debase-
ment of philosophy. But what Stump has not obviously noticed is that shying 
away from any discussion of those tragedies while nonetheless claiming to have 
supplied a “defense” of every “mode” of suffering, has its own unpalatable, and 
implausible, implications.
Finally, I offered an example of how a narrative orientation opens the door to 
religiously relevant sources from diverse cultural traditions. In Wendy Doniger 
O’Flaherty’s work on Hindu mythology we see a pluralistic sensibility in operation, 
since she treats the mythological sources not as merely alternative inflections of an 
underlying monolithic worldview, but as representing “several recognizably differ-
ent conceptual attitudes to evil” (O’Flaherty 1976, 11), each of which has a place in 
Hinduism’s “rich chord of unresolved harmony” (13).
The pluralistic strategies that I have been commending here have nothing, or very 
little, to do with what has commonly been called “religious pluralism” in the phi-
losophy of religion. When a philosopher such as John Hick, for example, urges his 
readers to accept his “pluralistic hypothesis,” he is seeking to promote the idea that 
all religions—or, at any rate, all the “great” ones—subscribe to the same set of ethi-
cal values and are, in essence, directed towards the same metaphysical reality.10 A 
pluralistic orientation to narrative, by contrast, places the emphasis on heterogeneity 
and divergence. Without simply ignoring commonalities where they exist, such an 
orientation is one that turns to narratives as resources for attending to the details of 
particular cases rather than always craving to subsume those particularities under a 
general theory. It is in this spirit of a more radical pluralism that a pluralistic orien-
tation to narrative can make a valuable contribution to an expanded and diversified 
conception of philosophy of religion.11
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